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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARY LOUISE GERARD,

-vs.-

Pla;i,ntifj-Respondent,

PRESTON L. YOUNG and

Case
No.10712

UNICE YOUNG,

Defmidants-Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff, as lessor of a cafe to defendants, sought
caneellation of the lease on the grounds that defendants
were gambling and allowing gambling at the cafe by paying off on punchboards and pinballs, both before and
after service of notices to desist from the gambling or
to quit the premises.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff was granted Summary Judgment against
the defendants cancelling the lease between them and
awarding plaintiff damages for unlawful detainer.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmation of the judgment of tlie
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants were paying off bettors and punchboard 8
and pinball machines at a cafe which they had leased
from plaintiff. The cafe is situate at 890 West 2100
South, Salt Lake County, Utah. (Since filing of the Uomplaint the property has been annexed by Salt Lake City.)
The lease provided in part:
"It is understood and agreed that the said leased
premises shall be occupied and used as a restaurant and cafe only, and for no other purposr whatever, and the Youngs agree to conduct said business strictly in compliance with law."

On April 12, 1966, plaintiff served writtrn notirc
on defendants that they must stop the gambling or f]uit
the cafe (R. 4). This notice was based, by its terms,
both on the above terms of the lease and on 78-36-3(5)
UCA, 1953. Defendants ignored the notice and conti11ued their gambling, as admitted by their Answer whirh
states in part, '' ... defendants admit receipt of notice
and that they disregarded its contents (R. 8)." Then'after plaintiff accepted no further rents. On April lG,
1966, and again on May 15, 1966, when the rents became
due, plaintiff refused them, advising defendants that she
would not accept rents until and unless they desisted
from gambling. Defendants not having done so, plaintiff then served notice to quit on .June 6, 1966 (R. 6),
2

and when the time for that notice had run without complia11cc hy defendants, Complaint was filed on June 13,
1%n (R 1).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT DEFENDANTS HAD GAMBLING AT THE CAFE BEFORE AND AFTER SERVICE OF NOTICE
TO DESIST AND THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
The plaintiff's positive evidence is contained in the
nffidavits filed in support of her motions for summary
judgment. The affidavit of Evan Holladay indicates a
co11tinuous course of gambling as part of defendant's
business (R. 16). The affidavits of Bryant Hanson (R.17),
and Larry A. Hanson (R. 18), give evidence of specific
instancrs of gambling even after filing of the Complaint.
Tlw defendants' pleadings concern a point clearly
within the factual knowledge of the defendants - that
they either did or did not, as part of their business, pay
off on their punchboards and pinballs to winning players.
Despite many pleadings, the defendants have still
neither admitted nor denied the gambling. Their Answer
states, ''Defendants admit receipt of notice and that
they disregarded the same," (R. 8). If they had not
been gnmhling as part of their business, they would have
hatl an automatic compliance with the notices. The
Airnwrr further states, "If plaintiff proves that defend-
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ants maintained pinball machines as gambling deviees
and punchboards as gambling devices, which is dt·
nied ... " (R. 8). This statement is also a non sequitur.
If they weren't gambling, why should they say plaintiff
might prove that they were 7 If they were gambling, and
this being a fact of which the defendants had to be aware
'
why did they deny it in their pleading?
The answer seems to violate R. 11, URCP, and to be
an admission of gambling under R 8 (b) and (d), URCP,
Deseret Savings Book v. Walker et al., 78 Utah 241,
248, 2P. 2d 609, holding on issue of non-specific denial
of facts within pleader's knowledge, ''There was no sprcific denial of the facts alleged in paragraph 6 of the
Complaint, and that it must therefor be assumed that
such facts were admitted. In that event no evidence of
their existence was necessary to support the findings of
such facts by the court."
Defendants' subsequent pleadings followed the same
course and might have exhausted the patience of the
court.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
based on the pleadings and the aforesaid affidavits (R.
14, 15). Defendants' reply was an affidavit which did
not deny that defendants used the cafe for gambling purposes, nor even that specific payoffs as alleged had beC'n
made. Their affidavit stated only that they had no recollection of the specific payoffs alleged by plaintiff (R. 23,
24). The court promptly entered Judgment agaii.tst
defendants. Defendants, without any notice to plain4
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tiff, JH'C\'ailed on the trial court to set aside the Judgment (R. 30), on the grounds that defendants' pleadings

were ''a mistake of counsel, George E. Bridwell, and
such should not be given efficacy to penalize substantive
rights of defendants" (R. 29).
On dose reading, however, defendants' affidavit in
support of their motion to set aside (R. 26), does not
deny a course of business including gambling, but only
again that they do not recall the specific payoffs alleged
hy the Hansons' affidavits (R. 17, 18), and that as to the
affidavit of Evan Holladay alleging a continuous course
of gambling (R. 16), Holladay might be a liar. The
clear inference from defendant's affidavits is that they
gambled so often that they can't remember who they
paid.
Plaintiff then took defendant Preston Young's deposition (R. 60). Pages 3 through 6 of the deposition are a
list of questions concerning whether the defendants maintained pinballs and punchboards at the cafe for gambling (Depos. 3, 4), both before and after notice to desist
and the filing of the Complaint, and as to whether both
before and after notice the defendant was paying off the
winners (Depos. 4-6). Defendant Preston Young refused to answer all questions based on the Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiff then filed a new Motion for Summary Judgment (R 36, 37). The Motion pointed out that defendants had still refused in their pleadings to admit or deny
the facts and that in the deposition the Fifth Amend5

ment was taken. Because defendants had C'Omplained
of collusion between plaintiff's affiants, plaintiff, in Ju. 1
motion, volunteered to have the affiants and ~~ddiL'
Davies, one of the persons who had received payoffs,
present at the hearing. They did appear and defendant
chose not to examine them. Defendant Preston Youn~\
deposition was published and plaintiff again was girPn
Summary Judgment.
The evidence summarized shows a course of gambling by defendants at all times. It shows that defendants still evade an answer to this issue in their plearlings. It show that the defendant Preston Young, refused to answer concerning gambling, based on selfincrimination at his deposition, even though he was then
aware that such refusal would be a basis for the C'ourt
to infer that he had been using the cafe for gamhling
purposes (Depos. 5, 6). State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 48n,
220 P. 704, states, although in a criminal case," ... Wlien
he voluntarily testified he is subject to the same rules as
other witnesses, and his failure to deny a material fact
within his knowledge previously testified to against him
warrants the inference that it is true." 20 Am ..Jur., E1'idence §190, pp. 193-194.

POINT II
DEFENDANTS' GAMBLING OPERATION AT
THE CAFE WAS A PROPER GROUND FOR
TERMINATION OF THEIR LEASE.
Defendants' gambling was unlawful. Their hrief alleges that the gambling statutes of Utah are void ;ind
6

1heir gambling was legal. This overlooks the general
prohihition against gambling contained in Art. 6 §27,
Utah Constitution, and implemented by anti-gambling
ordinances of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County.
~o

'rhe eaf e was situate in Salt Lake County at the
time this lawsuit was started. It is now in Salt Lake City
by annexation. Salt Lake County acted under the authority giwn it by the State Legislature in 17-5-35 UCA,
195~ (Police, building, and sanitary regulations - Power
to make) and 17-5-77 UCA, 1953 (Ordinances - Power
to Enact - Penalty for Violation).

4-10-1, Salt Lake County Ordinances, Revised 1953,
prohibits gambling in the county by language which covrrs pinball and punchboard payoffs.
''All gambling and gaming of every kind and description by playing of cards, dice, faro, roulPtte, keno, poker, slot machines, devices known
as trade machines, or any like machines or deYices by whatever name kno",'Tl, or any contrivance or device by or with which money, merchandise or anything of value may be bet, staked,
hazarded, won or lost, upon chance, or at any
other game or scheme of chance whatever, and by
betting on the results of horse races or on the
rr~mlt of any contest, skill or endurance of men
or animals bv means of book-making, pools, turn
exchanges o~ other devices, for money or other
property or thing of value within the county is
l1erf'IJy declared unlawful."
4-10-2, Salt Lake County Ordinances, revised 1953,
r1Pfi11Ps a g-amhling house without reference to frequency
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of the gambling, and makes it unlawful for either a lessee or a lessor of property to allow it to b<> use(l for
gambling,
"UNLAWFUL TO KEEP OR MAINTAIN GAMBLIK(;
HousE. It shall be unlawful for any person to conduct, keep or maintain a house, building, room or
other place where any of the games or schemeR
herein prohibited are carried on, conducted or operated. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to permit or suffer any of the games or
schemes herein declared unlawful to be carried on
or kept, maintained or operated in any house,
building, room or other place owned by him in
whole or in part or by him leased or let to any
other person.''

1-1-6 Salt Lake County Ordinances, Revised 1953, make
the above offenses misdemeanors.
The legislature by 10-8-41, UCA, 1953, gave a similar power to Salt Lake City, and the city enacted ordinances comparable to those of Salt I.Jake Count;· hy
17-1-4, 6, Salt Lake City Ordinances.
The gambling being unlawful, did plaintiff have
grounds for termination of the lease?
Defendant relies on this point on the case of Keat
ing v. Preston, 108 P. 2d 479 (Calif.). In that case the·
lessor's attempt to terminate a lease was denied although the lessee was permitting gambling. That case,
however, was conditioned on two points, first that the
lease didn't prohibit the conduct, and second that thei:r
was no statutory provision that made the conduct a basi>
for lease forfeiture.
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In the instant case as to the first point above, the
Jrasr provides:
"It is understood and agreed that the said leased
premises shall be occupied and used as a restaurant and cafe only, and for no other purpose whatPver, and the Youngs agree to conduct said business strictly in compliance with law." (R. 2)

As to the second point, 78-36-3, UCA, 1953, provides:
"UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY TENANT FOR TERM
THAN LIFE. - A Tenant of real property, for
a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
LESS

( 4) When he assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or
commits or permits waste thereon, or when he
sets up or carries on therein or thereon mny unlwwful business, or when he suffers, permits or
maintains on or about said premises any nuisance,
and remains in possession after service upon him
of a three days' notice to quit; or,
( 5) When he continues in possession, in person
nr by subtenant, after neglect or failure to per-

form any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the vroperfy is held, other
than those hereinbefore mentioned, (J;nd after 'IWtice in writin,q requiring in the alternative the
11erformance of such conditions or covenant or the
surrender of the property, serYed upon him, and,
if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of
the premises, also upon surh subtenant, shall remai-n 1111.complied u-ith for five days after service
thereof. Within three days after the servire of the
notire the tenant, or any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the
9

term, or other person interested in its contirnrnnep
may perform such condition or covenant an(l
there??T save the lease from forfeiture; provided,
that if the covenants and conditions of the J...1 .
· l
· "' Rr
v10 atecl by the lesse_e cannot afterwards hi! performed, then no notice as last prescribed herri 11
need be given." (Emphasis added)
·

It should be noted that while the unlawfnl cletaiiwr
statutes have a number of precise conditions coneernina
·'
due notice, that defendants have stated no point denying
proper notice at any point in the proceedings before the
trial court or this court.
Is the gambling of sufficient substance to justify
lease termination? The facts show a continuous course
of gambling. While the affidavits of the Hansons (R. li19) relate only isolated instances, the Complaint charges
a course of gambling and of mainta.ining rnachi11es for
that purpose at the cafe, as does the affidavit of Vivan
Holladay (R. 16). As stated in Point I, these allegations not having been denied are deemed admitted.
The gambling is substantial when viewed from plaintiff's eyes because, as lessor, she herself is liable to criminal prosecution if she allows gambling on the premise>
she has leased. 76-27-3 UCA, 1953, and 4-10-2, Salt Lake
County Ordinances, Revised, 1953. The defendantR ha\'ing refused to desist, she has the duty of forcing thC'm t.o.
which this lawsuit hopes to do. The rulr is stated rn
Zotalis v. Cannellos Pt al., 164 NW 807 (Minn.), whicli
held shaking dice for cigars was grounds for leasr termination based on a lease term against gamhling:

10

"The viola ti on of a condition in the lease cannot
be said to be trivial when the violation is of such
a character that the lessor may be subjected to a
criminal prosecution therefore.''
Finally, 78-36-3(5) UCA, 1953, makes no distinction
between great and small breaches of a lease, nor is there
a Utah case on this point. To satisfy this statute what is
rrquired is only that a breach be proved and that after
notice given pursuant to the statute, that the breach continue. On this there is no argument on the facts as
evidenced hy the unrebutted affidavits of Bryant and
Larry A. Hanson as to payoffs, on May 21, 1966, and
.June :.!, 1966 (R. 17-19), with notice under 78-3-36(4)&
(5) UCA, 1953, previously served on April 12, 1966
(R. 4, 5). Gilbert v. Peck, 121 P. 315 (Calif.); 32 Am.
Jur., Landlord and Tenant, ~864, pp. 731; 100 ALR 2d
469 ct :,;fl<I.
CONCLUSION
It is resprctfully submitted that the summary judgment is well supported by the facts and law and should
he affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
K. SAMUEL KING
Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent
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